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INTRODUCTION
In international law, the most nettlesome issues lurk at
the points where theory seems to contradict practice. For
example, while public international law presumes a system
of absolutely independent states,' those states now operate
in an environment characterized by interdependence and
overlapping spheres of competence.2 Mirroring the same
t Croft Professor of International Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr. Lecturer-in-
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law; Vice Chair, Institute for
Transnational Arbitration; Co-Editor-in-Chief, World Arbitration & Mediation
Review.
1. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (The Lotus Case) (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("International law governs relations between
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will .... Restrictions upon the independence of States
cannot therefore be presumed."); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-25
(2d ed. 2005) (explaining that, in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia marked "the
birth of an international system based on a plurality of independent States,
recognizing no superior authority over them").
2. See CASSESE, supra note 1, at 5 ("[M]ost components . . . of the
international community ... are so closely intertwined across national borders
that they make up the phenomenon usually called 'globalization."'); VAUGHAN
LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 290 (2007) (asserting that the power and influence of
individual nation-states have undeniably declined as a result of "[g]lobal
interdependence").
Cassese describes the juxtaposition of theoretical independence and
factual interdependence as "striking and unsatisfactory" because the chaotic
state of "global governance" remains largely incapable of solving shared
problems. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 5. Others see the juxtaposition as
reconcilable through the establishment of informal coordinating mechanisms,
such as the principle of comity. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belg. World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[C]omity serves our international
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tension in private international law, international
commercial arbitration holds itself out as a system founded
on party autonomy,3 but increasingly unfolds in a setting
where tribunals apply public regulatory laws without
regard to the law selected by the disputing parties.4 Here
system like the mortar which cements together a brick house. . . . [It] is a
necessary outgrowth of our international system of politically independent, [but]
socio-economically interdependent nation states.... [It] compels national courts
to act at all times to increase the international legal ties that advance the rule
of law.., among nations.").
3. See Bay Hotel & Resort Ltd. v. Cavalier Constr. Co., [2001] UKPC 34,
2001 WL 825663, 38 (July 16, 2001) (describing party autonomy as a "key
principle of current arbitration law"); American Diagnostica, Inc. v. Gradipore
Ltd., 24a Y.B. Comm. Arb. 574, 583 (NSW Sup. Ct. (Austl.) 1998) (referring to
party autonomy as the "cornerstone of modern arbitration"); Case No. 1512 of
1971, 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 128, 130 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) ("There are few principles
more universally admitted in private international law than that referred to by
the standard terms of the 'proper law of the contract', according to which the law
governing the contract is the law chosen by the parties ...."); PHILLIP LANDOLT,
MODERNISED EC COMPETITION LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 6-02 (2006)
("Since international arbitration is private, the role of party autonomy, in
relation in particular to ... substantive law.., is particularly pronounced.., so
as to become almost a cure-all, a mantra to be recited in response to any
question thrown up."); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-11 (2003) ("Party autonomy is the ultimate power
determining the form, structure, system and other details of the arbitration.");
Loukas A. Mistelis, Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration: Too Much
Too Early or Too Little Too Late?, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 291, 294 (George A. Bermann & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2011)
(explaining that the promotion of party autonomy represented "a major objective
of the arbitration community in the twentieth century," and has become "the
primary element that regulates all aspects of international arbitration").
4. One observer describes the increasing application of so-called "mandatory
law" by arbitral tribunals:
Although traditionally, an arbitrator might not have been expected to
take into account the law of the enforcing jurisdiction when rendering
an award, increasingly, this is changing with regard to regulatory areas
that fall under the heading of public policy or ordre public....
...Although traditionally, tribunals have seen their responsibility as
primarily to the parties appearing before them, and have not generally
assumed a duty to enforce the public interest, the duty to render an
enforceable award in a case involving statutory and regulatory claims
appears to impose new responsibilities.
MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 81-82 (2008); see also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL.,
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 3.128 to 3.135 (5th ed.
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too, globalization represents the source of friction. To
promote international judicial cooperation among inter-
reliant states, legal thinkers developed the concept of
mandatory laws,5  which enable adjudicators to apply
2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER] (describing the increasing tendency to
treat competition norms as mandatory rules in international commercial
arbitration); LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-08, 6-52 (noting that "over the last
decade ... arbitrators have increasingly been applying mandatory norms" such
as competition laws); Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules
of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 205, 207-08
(2005) ("To complicate matters, mandatory rules issues are on the rise. With the
ever-increasing popularity of arbitration, expanded notions of arbitrability and
increased legislative activities in this area, mandatory rules issues have been
said anecdotally to arise in over 50 per cent of cases."); Horacio A. Grigera Na6n,
Choice-of-Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, in 289
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 380 (2001) (describing the increased application of lois de
police by international commercial arbitral tribunals over the past ten years);
Nathalie Voser, Current Developments, Mandatory Rules of Law as a
Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 319, 336 (1996) ("[It is safe to assume that in the last decade
the trend favorable to the application of mandatory rules has, at least to some
extent, benefitted from increased support from scholarly opinion as well as from
court and arbitral decisions."). Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that "the
subject has . . . emerged as something of a preoccupation of those who are
involved in the world of international commercial arbitration." George A.
Bermann, The Origin and Operation of Mandatory Rules, in MANDATORY RULES
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 1, 1.
By contrast, the practice of municipal courts shows "no pattern of
assistance [to] foreign interests" and "no body of cases applying foreign
mandatory law in this way." Hannah L. Buxbaum, Mandatory Rules in Civil
Litigation: Status of the Doctrine Post-Globalization, in MANDATORY RULES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 31, 36. If anything, courts are
retreating from the application of mandatory laws, including the mandatory
laws of their own jurisdiction. Id. at 44-45, 47.
In other words, just as the balance swings from party autonomy to
mandatory laws in international commercial arbitration, the balance swings the
opposite way in international civil litigation. One wonders if the counter-trends
are moving towards convergence or towards opposite poles. At first glance, at
least, the latter possibility seems more likely. Whereas the application of
mandatory norms contemplates a leading role for adjudicators in coordinating
the interests of interdependent states, deference to party autonomy signals
greater confidence in private ordering as the key to managing "the complexities
of global transactions." Id. at 47; see also id. at 34, 44, 48-49.
5. See Thomas G. Guedj, The Theory of the Lois de Police, A Functional
Trend in Continental Private International Law-A Comparative Analysis with
Modern American Theories, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 671 (1991) ("[Tlhe close
social, economical and political interdependence among modern [s]tates
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important regulatory norms enacted by the place of
adjudication or by jurisdictions closely connected to the
parties, 6 without regard to (and often in contravention to)
private agreements about the governing law.7 Common
examples of mandatory laws include norms involving the
regulation of competitive markets (antitrust or competition
laws), securities regulation, currency controls,
environmental laws, and embargos.' Opinions differ on
whether mandatory laws also include norms designed to
protect groups with inferior bargaining power.9 However,
commands a minimum of co-operation which in turn gives some credit to a claim
that the judge, at least in some instances, should apply the mandatory rules of
third states, too."); see also Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 44 ("[T]he growing
interdependence of states, and the resulting need for greater international
cooperation were in the past identified as a basis for extending the doctrine of
mandatory rules to permit the application ... of the law of other states.").
6. See ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 7.49 to 7.59 (2005) (explaining that one may divide
mandatory laws into two categories: (1) those applied by the seat of arbitration,
and (2) those applied by third states having a close connection to the parties or
the underlying transaction).
7. See Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 206 ('Mandatory rules
are laws that purport to apply irrespective of a contract's proper law or the
procedural regime selected by the parties."); Pierre Mayer, Mandatory Rules of
Law in International Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT'L 274, 275 (1986) ("In matters of
contract, the effect of a mandatory rule of the law of a given country is to create
an obligation to apply such a rule . . .despite the fact that the parties have
expressly or implicitly subjected their contract to the law of another country.");
Audley Sheppard, Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitration:
An English Law Perspective, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 171, 171 ("By 'mandatory rule,' I mean an
imperative rule of law that cannot be excluded by agreement of the parties.").
8. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2178 (2009);
LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-19; Daniel Hochstrasser, Choice of Law and
'Foreign" Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration, 11 J. INT'L ARB., no. 1,
Mar. 1994 at 57, 68; Mayer, supra note 7, at 275; Voser, supra note 4, at 325.
9. Compare Mayer, supra note 7, at 275 (indicating that such norms
properly qualify as mandatory laws), with Voser, supra note 4, at 325 (arguing
that rules intended to protect a weaker party should not be considered
international mandatory rules). For European Union member states, the Rome I
Regulation seems to have resolved this debate by excluding consumer and
employment laws from the definition of "overriding mandatory norms." See
ALEXANDER J. BELOHLAVEK, 2 ROME CONVENTION/ROME I REGULATION:
COMMENTARY 09.81, at 1492 (2010) ("Provisions regarding protection of the
weaker party to a contract, such as consumers, are not a part of the expression
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whatever the proper scope of mandatory laws, the point is
that they aim to harmonize the interests of states in a
globalized world and, in so doing, encroach on the
independence and autonomy long regarded as the
theoretical underpinnings of international law.
In both public and private international law, the
apparent divide between theory and practice results in
surprise and conflict. On the public side, one may refer to
fierce transatlantic disputes about the extraterritorial
application of competition laws. Although the energetic
overreaching of U.S. antitrust laws supplied the focus for
debate during the 1970s and 1980s,"° more recently the
European Union ("EU") has developed a taste for regulating
business arrangements grounded in the United States.1' For
example, in 2001, EU competition regulators scuttled
General Electric's proposed takeover of Honeywell
International, provoking expressions of "dismay" by
President Bush.2 Similarly, in 1997, the resistance of EU
regulators to the merger between Boeing and McDonnell-
overriding mandatory provisions."); see also infra notes 74-83 and accompanying
text.
10. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 648-50 (4th ed. 2007); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (7th ed. 2008) ("In the field of economic
regulation, and especially anti-trust legislation, controversy has arisen [as a
result of] American policies [that] have provoked a strong reaction from a large
number of foreign governments."); LOWE, supra note 2, at 173 ("[The so-called]
'effects doctrine' has been controversial, for instance when used by US
authorities to break up cartels formed lawfully by non-US companies outside
the United States. Some such cartels have been organized with the explicit
approval and encouragement of the national States of the companies concerned
.... "); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 688 (6th ed. 2008) (indicating
that the United States' "energetic" application of its antitrust laws to aliens
outside of U.S. territory on the "basis of the so-called 'effects' doctrine [has]
provoked considerable controversy").
11. See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 10, at 650 ("More recently, the
extraterritoriality debate has broadened, to include objections against
extraterritorial applications of national competition laws by the EU and other
states. In particular ... the EU competition laws have repeatedly been applied
to conduct occurring either predominantly or entirely outside the European
Union. U.S. companies and officials have been among the most vigorous critics
of such actions." (footnotes omitted)).
12. Edmund L. Andrews & Paul Meller, Europe Ends Bid by G.E. for
Honeywell, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at C1.
1132 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
Douglas Corporation triggered a political stand-off during
which U.S. cabinet secretaries publicly discussed avenues
for retaliation, President Clinton personally threatened
trade sanctions against European states, and both houses of
Congress passed resolutions criticizing the EU's
"unwarranted and unprecedented interference in a United
States business transaction."13
The apparent divide between theory and practice can
also generate rude awakenings and conflict on the private
side of international law. For example, prominent members
of the arbitration bar have emphasized that the application
of mandatory laws can come as a "bad surprise" to disputing
parties who have carefully selected the laws of another
jurisdiction. 4 Furthermore, intense doctrinal conflicts about
the relationship between party autonomy and mandatory
laws cast a shadow of uncertainty over international
commercial arbitration.15 While some arbitrators reject the
very existence of mandatory laws,16 others recognize their
existence, but emphasize the reluctance of tribunals to
apply them in practice.17 Still others regard the application
13. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS
331-32 (3d ed. 2010).
14. See, e.g., Jacques Werner, Note, A Swiss Comment on Mitsubishi, 3 J.
INT'L ARB., no. 4, 1986 at 81, 83 (explaining that the International Chamber of
Commerce's views on the application of mandatory laws, submitted in an
amicus brief in the Mitsubishi case, "came as a bad surprise to many long-time
users of ICC arbitration").
15. See Mistelis, supra note 3, at 291 ("Few legal issues ignite such major
debates amongst lawyers as the issue of mandatory rules of law."); see also
TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, 7.50 ("There is no consensus ... as to
when or if an arbitral tribunal should take into account the mandatory laws of
another country."); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Does International Arbitration
Need a Mandatory Rules Method?, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 147, 147 ("[The role of mandatory rules in
international arbitration remains a persistent source of debate.").
16. See LEW ET AL., supra note 3, 17-27 ("Other than that of the chosen
applicable law, there is no mandatory law for international arbitration.");
Mistelis, supra note 3, at 299 ('There is no basis for a tribunal to ignore the
express choice of the parties because it determines that there is a contrary
mandatory rule in one of [the] national laws [in effect at the place of arbitration,
the place of performance, or the place for enforcement of awards].").
17. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2184 ("In general, arbitral tribunals have been
reluctant to override contractual choice-of-law agreements."); FOUCHARD,
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1526
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of mandatory laws to be well settled, at least in particular
contexts.'8 Even within this last group, doctrine remains
inconsistent and poorly articulated.'9 While perhaps less
dramatic than inter-governmental political spats, such
debates reinforce the potential for misjudgments in a field
that demands clarity, ° particularly with respect to the
governing law.2'
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD,
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN] ("[A]rbitrators have so far remained particularly reluctant
to apply mandatory rules other than those of the lex contractus."); HORAcIO A.
GRIGERA NAON, CHOICE-OF-LAw PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 74 (1992) ("Arbitrators have shown a certain hesitation in applying
international mandatory rules not belonging to the proper law of the contract.");
LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-10, 6-13 (recalling "certain factors of resistance" to
the application of mandatory laws, including the "almost hagiographic
incantation of 'party autonomy"'); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6,
6.22, at 188 ("Quite often mandatory laws, other than those applicable at the
seat of the arbitration or relevant under the applicable law, will be ignored.");
Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 226 ("There is significant academic
support . . . for an approach that would apply no mandatory rules .... ");
Bernard Hanotiau, What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability?, 12 ARB. INT'L
391, 397 (1996) ("[It is a fact that numerous arbitrators remain strongly
opposed to the application [of foreign mandatory laws] in the field of
arbitrability .... "); Mayer, supra note 7, at 279 ("[I1n at least some quarters of
the arbitration milieu, there is a manifest hostility to the application of
mandatory rules of law that do not belong to the law governing the contract.").
18. See Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in
International Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB., no. 4, Dec. 1997 at 23, 36-37
(asserting that, during the 1990s, arbitral practice in Switzerland experienced a
sea change favoring the application of foreign competition norms as mandatory
laws); Laurence Shore, Applying Mandatory Rules of Law in International
Commercial Arbitration, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 3, at 131, 131 ("Arbitrators must apply mandatory rules of the seat of
arbitration. This is, in most circles, accepted.").
19. See Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 243 ("Arbitrators
confronted with mandatory rules questions find few easy answers. There is now
a significant body of literature to guide them, but generally speaking opinions
tend to be cursory and contradictory.").
20. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) ("[O]rderliness
and predictability [are] essential to any international business transaction.");
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 53, 77 (1992) ("[Ilnternational business transactions require stability and
predictability to be successful.").
21. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516 ("A contractual provision specifying in
advance ... the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensible precondition to
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While reconciliation between the theory of party
autonomy and the practice of applying mandatory laws
seems desirable for the maintenance of stability in
international commercial arbitration, it remains
complicated by the fact that the contours of emerging
practice remain poorly understood.22 For example, while one
can document the increasing application of competition
norms as mandatory law in international commercial
arbitration,23 we know far less about (1) the justifications for
applying competition norms as mandatory law, (2) the
factors that affect the disposition of tribunals to apply
competition norms as mandatory law, and (3) the legal
consequences of doing so. At best, these elements of practice
remain "ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive
to the grasp.'' 24 As a result, it becomes difficult even to verify
the perceived distance between theory and practice, much
less to design appropriate mechanisms for bridging possible
gaps.25
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction.").
22. See Barraclough & Waineymer, supra note 4, at 208 ("[Tlhere is a notable
lack of attempts to examine the issue from first principles and establish a sound
theoretical framework for arbitrators to use when confronted with mandatory
rules."); Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 32 ('Yet for all [the] attention [lavished on
mandatory laws], it is not clear that a fully realized doctrine of mandatory rules
has emerged."); Mayer, supra note 7, at 274 ("The impact of mandatory rules of
law is of great practical importance in international arbitration. Yet it has
scarcely been analysed in a serious manner. ... This paucity of scholarly work is
surprising."); Mistelis, supra note 3, at 291 ("Most relevant questions, including
[the] notion, relevance and applicability [of mandatory laws] are not settled and
there is certainly a lack of fruitful communication between scholars and
practitioners."); Voser, supra note 4, at 319 ('There is uncertainty in the
international world of arbitration about the role of mandatory rules in
international commercial disputes.").
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrator and "Mandatory Rules of Law," in
MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 77, 78
(quoting The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922) (Holmes, J.)) (expressing
dissatisfaction with "an endless literature" on mandatory laws that focuses on
abstract principles to the exclusion of pragmatic concerns).
25. In a well regarded article, two observers described the landscape for
disputing parties, arbitrators, and scholars seeking to understand the
phenomenon of mandatory laws:
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Assuming that careful examination of practice
represents a critical but neglected task, this Article focuses
on the causes, catalysts, and consequences of applying
European competition law26 to a dispute between U.S. and
European energy companies under a contract governed by
New York law. In this example, a U.S. energy producer
agrees in 2005 to supply liquefied natural gas ("LNG") to a
European energy distributor for resale to its regular, local
customers over a twenty-five year period, subject to the
understanding that the distributor may redirect deliveries
to superior business opportunities ("SBOs") upon notice and
agreement to share the increased revenue with the U.S.
producer. After learning that the distributor has diverted
substantial LNG shipments without notice or an offer to
share the increased revenue, the producer commences
arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC Rules") for
breach of the SBO provisions. Despite the contractual choice
of New York law, the distributor pleads that the SBO
provisions are invalid because they violate European
Arbitrators confronted with mandatory rules questions find few easy
answers. There is now a significant body of literature to guide them,
but generally speaking opinions tend to be cursory and contradictory.
Arbitral case law is even more unhelpful. Despite the increasing
number of arbitral tribunals confronted with mandatory rules issues,
explicit analyses of principle are few and far between. . . . [T]he
situation needs to improve if a consistent and principled approach is to
be achieved.
Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 243; see also Sheppard, supra note
7, at 171 ("The application of mandatory rules has been described as one of the
most difficult issues in international commercial arbitration.").
26. For the purposes of this Article, "European competition law" means the
treaty provisions formerly codified in (and extensively analyzed in the literature
as) the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community arts. 81, 82, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. Subsequently, the treaty provisions were codified in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union arts. 101, 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU. The first provision prohibits "all agreements ...
and concerted practices which may affect trade between [EU] Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market .... " EC Treaty art. 81 (as in effect
2005) (now TFEU art. 101). The second provision forbids the "abuse . . . of a
dominant position within the common market ... in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States." EC Treaty art. 82 (as in effect 2005) (now TFEU art.
102).
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competition law. At the time that the dispute arises, the
distributor has also received, but not paid for, $25 million
worth of regular LNG deliveries and seems disposed to walk
away from the long-term supply agreement due to changing
market trends.27
I. CAUSES
Before engaging the substance of the respondent's
arguments about European competition law, the tribunal
must find some justification for disregarding the parties'
contractual choice of New York law.2" Invoking Article 35 of
the ICC Rules (which mandates the use of best efforts to
render enforceable awards), 9 and mindful of the Eco Swiss
case (in which the European Court of Justice declared
European competition law to be a matter of public policy
27. The broad outlines of this scenario are drawn from publicly available
information about a business venture, and subsequent dispute, between BPA
America Production Co. ("BPA") and the Spanish energy company Repsol YPF
S.A. ("Repsol"). See COMPASS LEXECON, COMPASS LEXECON'S 2009 CLIENT
NEWSLETTER 7 (2010), http://www.compasslexecon.com/highlights/Documents/
Newsletter Final Dated 01-11-10 V2.pdf; KING & SPALDING, ANNUAL REVIEW
2010, at 15 (2010), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserverlKSpublic/Library/
publicationfKingSpaldingAnnualReview20l0.pdf. However, the scenario
remains hypothetical in the sense that it assumes some facts contrary to
publicly available information. For example, while the scenario refers to
arbitration under the ICC Rules, BPA and Repsol apparently submitted their
dispute to arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules. KING & SPALDING, supra, at 15. In
addition, the scenario simply assumes a number of facts for pedagogical reasons.
These include the date and anticipated duration of the business arrangements
between the U.S. energy producer and the European distributor, the existence of
outstanding payments for regular LNG shipments, and the commercial
motivations of the disputing parties.
28. See Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 217 ('The difficulty... is
in deciding just when party autonomy should be trumped.").
29. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 35 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC RULES], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/
Court/Arbitration/other/rules arb english.pdf ("In all matters not expressly
provided for in these Rules, the [ICC] Court and the Arbitral Tribunal shall act
in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the
Award is enforceable at law."); see also Voser, supra note 4, at 333 ("An arbitral
tribunal has the duty to ensure that its award will be enforceable.").
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when reviewing arbitral awards in EU member states),"
many arbitrators would apply European competition law to
increase the prospects for enforcement in the respondent's
home jurisdiction.3' More broadly, some arbitrators regard
30. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benneton Int'l NV, 1999
E.C.R. 1-3055, 31-39. For discussion of the Eco Swiss decision see LANDOLT,
supra note 3, 6-87 to 6-89; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, 19.24 to 19.28;
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, I 3.131 to 3.135; Maurits Dolmans & Jacob
Grierson, Arbitration and the Modernization of EC Antitrust Law: New
Opportunities and New Responsibilities, 14 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., no. 2, Fall
2003 at 37, 43; Hans van Houtte, The Application by Arbitrators of Articles 81 &
82 and Their Relationship with the European Commission, 19 EUR. Bus. L. REV.
63, 63-66 (2008); Robert B. von Mehren, The Eco Swiss Case and International
Arbitration, 19 ARB. INT'L 465, 467-69 (2003). Among other things, the European
Court of Justice held that the courts of member states must review arbitral
awards for compliance with European competition law, even if the parties had
not raised the issue in the arbitral proceedings. Eco Swiss, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055,
1 7, 30; see also LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-88, at 147 ("It should be noted that
the court in Eco Swiss requires review not just for a failure to apply EC
competition law, but apparently, for a failure to apply it properly.").
31. See Case No. 8626 of 1996, Final Award, 14 ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull., no. 2,
Fall 2003 at 55, 18-19 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) ("Furthermore, we are of the
opinion that an arbitral tribunal should always be concerned with the
effectiveness of its decisions .... In the present arbitration the enforcement of
any award.., would.., be sought... in Germany .... Accordingly we consider
that we are bound to consider the applicability of [European competition law].");
Dolmans & Grierson, supra note 30, at 44 ("[A]rbitrators . . . have to raise
European competition law issues, taking into account their obligation to make
every effort to ensure that their award is enforceable at law."); Mayer, supra
note 7, at 284 ("[A]rbitrators should pay heed to the future of their award. They
should consider that if they do not apply a mandatory rule of law, the award will
in all likelihood be refused enforcement in the [jurisdiction] which promulgated
that rule."); Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and Competition Law: The
Position of the Courts and of Arbitrators, 27 ARB. INT'L 1, 19 (2011) (recalling the
arbitrators' "duty to render an enforceable award," which implies that "they will
be expected to take into account the competition rules in force at the place of
enforcement"); Voser, supra note 4, at 335 ("Concern for the effectiveness of the
award may be a reason for arbitrators to respect the mandatory rules of the
state where the award may be enforced.. . ."); see also LEW ET AL., supra note 3,
19-43 (supporting the application of European competition law "when the
award is likely to be enforced within a[n] [EU] Member State"); MOSES, supra
note 4, at 82 ("[T]he duty to render an enforceable award in a case involving
statutory and regulatory claims appears to impose new responsibilities. A
tribunal that does not consider the public interest ... risks offending the public
policy in the jurisdiction of enforcement and thereby rendering an unenforceable
award."); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, 3.135 (regarding the Eco Swiss
decision as an effort to encourage arbitral tribunals to apply European
competition law if they hope to ensure the enforceability of their awards in
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the application of mandatory norms as the price of securing
the political support of states for arbitration.32 Standing by
themselves, these views lack principle, invite blowback, and
encourage speculation.
The pursuit of enforcement for its own sake lacks
principle because it suggests that tribunals can (and should)
do whatever it takes to enhance the prospects for universal
acceptance of their awards without regard to the law or
Europe). But see BORN, supra note 8, at 2182 (asserting that the "general duty"
to render an enforceable award "does not, as a matter of contract, override a
specific choice-of-law clause'); Hanotiau, supra note 17, at 398 (indicating that
tribunals should ensure that their awards are enforceable at the place of
arbitration, but concluding that "a majority of arbitrators" recognize no duty to
apply foreign mandatory laws to ensure enforcement in other jurisdictions); van
Houtte, supra note 30, at 68 ("[L]egal rules should be applied because they are
part of the proper law of the contract, because they are relevant mandatory
rules or because of the public policy of the seat of arbitration; not merely
because their application would increase the chances of enforcement abroad.").
32. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-07, at 108 ("[The failure to apply
mandatory laws] brings arbitration into disrepute and thus jeopardises it as an
institution .... If States are not satisfied that their competition law is being
treated with sufficient seriousness in arbitration they can remove it from the
categories of matters which are arbitrable."); Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 209
("Arbitral proceedings and awards and arbitration agreements would risk losing
the generous degree of acceptance and support they presently enjoy at the level
of national legal systems and jurisdictions should Arbitral Tribunals not have
the authority to establish the existence and advance the application of
international mandatory rules . . . ."); Hochstrasser, supra note 8, at 85
("[I]nternational arbitration finally depends on the goodwill of... [s]tates and
their courts for the enforcement of arbitral awards."); Mayer, supra note 7, at
285-86 (admonishing arbitrators to apply mandatory laws "out of a sense of duty
to the survival of international arbitration as an institution"); Voser, supra note
4, at 337 ("[Alrbitration will only be able to maintain its relevance and, more
importantly, gain greater influence in areas where states have strong legislative
policies-such as antitrust, exchange, or environmental control-by considering
mandatory rules."); see also Hanotiau, supra note 17, at 397 (indicating that
arbitrators will consider, but will not be motivated exclusively by, concern for
"the future of the arbitral institution"); Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 31, at 19
& n.50 ("[T]he application of competition law by arbitrators is . . . the
implementation of a bargain between states . . . and the arbitral community
. . . . [A]rbitrators may also have in mind a broader consideration of the
'interests of arbitration' . . . ."). But see BORN, supra note 8, at 2182 ("[T]he
parties' legal rights should not (and cannot) turn upon an arbitrator's 'sense of
duty to the survival of international arbitration as an institution."' (quoting
Mayer, supra note 7, at 286)).
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solemn agreements about the applicable law.33 The quest for
political approval for its own sake seems no better because
it also implies that expediency should prevail over legal
analysis in deliberations. To the extent that such views
represent anything more than a license for arbitrary
decision-making, the operative principle seems to be that
arbitrators owe their primary duties not to the parties or to
the applicable law, but to the process of arbitration as
measured by judicial and legislative acceptance of their
work. Given the identity between the arbitral process and
arbitrators as repeat players,34 one wonders if an overriding
duty to the arbitral process represents a polite way of
saying that arbitrators owe their primary duties to
themselves."
While the pursuit of widely enforceable awards and
political approval represent important secondary goals,
33. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2182-83 ("[Tlhe arbitrator's primary duty must
be to render an award in accordance with the parties' arbitration agreement,
even if it proves unenforceable in some places, rather than a universally
enforceable award that disregards the parties' agreement."); Blessing, supra
note 18, at 30-31 ("[It would seem entirely wrong for an arbitrator to give that
concern [for enforceability of the award] a weight which it does not deserve, or to
give it a weight which would outweigh a legally correct decision . . .");
Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 160 (doubting that arbitrators should invoke the
duty to render enforceable awards "as a means of exceeding or violating the
parties' agreement, particularly where application of a mandatory rule excluded
by the parties will operate to change the result of the dispute").
34. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in
Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895, 1923 (2010) (indicating that
international commercial arbitration has until recently been dominated by an
"elite" and "relatively homogenous group of ... arbitrators" who operated as
"repeat players" within the profession); see also YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G.
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 8-10 (1996) ("Only a very
select and elite group of individuals is able to serve as international arbitrators.
... Members of the inner circle... often referred to this group as a 'mafia' or a
'club."'); Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration
and Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1096 (2011) ("[A] relatively small pool of
arbitrators is appointed in the most prominent and influential [investment
treaty] cases.").
35. See Rau, supra note 24, at 81-82 (finding no difference between an
"arbitrator's 'sense of duty to the survival of international arbitration as an
institution"' and "enlightened self-interest," "at least with respect to
[arbitrators] with a career stake as ... repeat player[s]" (quoting Mayer, supra
note 7, at 285-86)).
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exaggeration of those themes also invites blowback. For
example, by emphasizing expediency and by neglecting
justifications that conform to widespread views about party
autonomy, tribunals may leave the impression of contempt
for the parties' agreement,36 thereby creating grounds for
courts to refuse enforcement of their awards under Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention.37 Conversely, assuming
that courts do not discipline tribunals by refusing to enforce
awards, the impression of contempt for private agreements
seems likely to undermine support for arbitration among its
commercial users. Either way, the pursuit of expediency
outside the normal bounds of party autonomy seems likely
to harm the integrity of the arbitral process.
Even if it did not lack principle or invite blowback, the
emphasis on securing enforcement invites speculation in the
application of mandatory laws. For example, while
arbitrators can safely assume that the disputing parties
have assets in their home jurisdictions, they can only guess
about the possibilities for enforcement against assets in
third states,38 even though the New York Convention and
the rise of a global economy have increased the relevance of
multi-jurisdictional enforcement strategies.39 Under these
36. Cf. BORN, supra note 8, at 2192 ("Some authorities reject the proposition
that arbitral tribunals may (or must) apply the mandatory laws . . . of states
other than that of the parties' chosen law. Commentators reason that such a
result would contradict the parties' autonomy to select the applicable law."
(footnote omitfed)).
37. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V(1)(d), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York
Convention] (authorizing courts to refuse enforcement of awards when "the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties");
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 17, § 1528 ("[B]y applying
mandatory rules other than that of the lex contractus . .. arbitrators run the
risk of exceeding the terms of their brief ... ").
38. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 276 ("[T]here may be several potential
execution jurisdictions, and one cannot always predict the attitude of judges
who may be called upon to examine the award."); van Houtte, supra note 30, at
68 ("[T]he places of prospective enforcement may be manifold and
unpredictable."); Voser, supra note 4, at 335 ("[Alssets are often distributed
among different countries, and the arbitrator cannot foresee where enforcement
will be sought.").
39. See, e.g., Rau, supra note 24, at 118 (recognizing "the transitory nature of
'assets' in an electronic world," which logically increases the likelihood of
seeking enforcement of awards in multiple jurisdictions).
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circumstances, the emphasis on securing enforcement
seems likely to support a pair of unpalatable alternatives.
First, because the emphasis on enforcement requires
arbitrators to speculate about the location of assets, the
application of mandatory law may descend into
unpredictable guesswork. ° Conversely, arbitrators wishing
to avoid speculation might skew towards the application of
mandatory laws of the disputing parties' home jurisdictions,
a result that secures predictability by forsaking any real
inquiry into the likely scenarios for enforcement. Either
way, one faces the prospect of relying on an unknown, or an
incomplete, factual matrix in the application of mandatory
laws.
By contrast, justifications for mandatory laws that
reflect common understandings about party autonomy rest
on principle and settled expectations. In this regard, one
may observe that even those legal systems most clearly
oriented towards autonomy still recognize the existence of
peremptory norms. For example, while embracing a
community of absolutely independent states that submit to
40. See Case No. 6106 of 1988, Interim Award, 5 ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull., no.
2, Nov. 1994 at 44, 44-45 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) ("[I]t would be an impossible and
sterile task for the arbitrators to determine . . .where an award may be
enforced, since enforcement may take place at any place where assets of the
condemned party are located. Such location of assets need not be permanent and
therefore is . . .unpredictable."); LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-83 ("[I]t is . . .a
matter of inordinate difficulty during [an] arbitration proceeding to predict
where the award will be enforced."); Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at
215 ("[W]hen parties have assets in different countries it is difficult to predict
the place of enforcement."); Blessing, supra note 18, at 30-31 (indicating that
concerns about the enforceability of awards seem rather speculative given
uncertainly as to which jurisdiction will be called upon for enforcement);
Mistelis, supra note 3, at 308 ("[I]t is mere speculation where enforcement of the
award may be sought."); Rau, supra note 24, at 118 ("[Ilt may ... be impossible
for the arbitrators to predict with any accuracy just which jurisdictions may
later be called on to recognize an award."); van Houtte, supra note 30, at 68
("The arbitration process would lose its foreseeability if the law to be applied by
the arbitrators depended on their assessment of the possibilities to enforce the
award in different places."). Also, because "the likely 'place of enforcement' will
vary depending on just who the successful party was," Rau, supra note 24, at
118, prognostication about the likely place of enforcement invites speculation
about the merits at a stage when the parties will not have fully developed their
cases.
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regulation only by consent,4' the Westphalian model of
international law42 has always reserved space for mandatory
norms, known first as "natural law"43 and, later, placed
under the rubric of 'Jus cogens."" If peremptory norms seem
reconcilable with the vast autonomy of states on the
international plane, the existence of comparable limits on
private parties hardly comes as a surprise.
In fact, national legal systems almost universally accept
the principle that strong public policies can override private
agreements deemed to produce socially undesirable
results.45 Mandatory rules, thus, reflect the premise that all
41. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27) ("[I]n international law there are no rules,
other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned .... ");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt.
I, ch. 1, intro, note, at 18 (1987) ("Modern international law is rooted in
acceptance by states which constitute the system.").
42. The Westphalian model of international law has been characterized as "a
plurality of independent States, recognizing no superior authority over them."
CASSESE, supra note 1, at 24.
43. See M. DE VATTEL, 1 THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS §§ 4,
5 (1759) (asserting that states remain "absolutely free and independent with
respect to all men, or to foreign nations," but accepting that they simultaneously
remain "subject to the laws of nature, and [ ] obliged to respect them in all its
proceedings").
44. Virtually all writers recognize that international law includes a category
of peremptory or nonderogable norms known as "jus cogens." BROWNLIE, supra
note 10, at 510-12; CASSESE, supra note 1, at 201-02; MARK WESTON JANIS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 67 (5th ed. 2008); LOWE, supra note 2, at 59; SHAW,
supra note 10, at 124-25. At a minimum, these include the prohibition on the
aggressive use of force, genocide, and slave trading. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at
510-11; CASSESE, supra note 1, at 202; LOWE, supra note 2, at 59; SHAW, supra
note 10, at 126.
Many writers regard jus cogens as the resurrection of, or successor to,
natural law. See JANIS, supra, at 66 ("It makes better sense to view jus cogens as
a modern form of natural law . . . ."); see also CASSESE, supra note 1, at 200 n.3
(indicating that jus cogens translated the natural law concepts of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century theorists such as Emmerich de Vattel into terms of
positive law); SHAw, supra note 10, at 125-26 (explaining that jus cogens
"reflects the influence of Natural Law thinking").
45. CASSESE, supra note 1, at 10 ("Every domestic system contains a core of
values that members of the community cannot disregard, not even when they
engage in private transactions inter se."); see also BORN, supra note 8, at 2170-71
("Many national conflict of law systems recognize that mandatory rules of public
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legal systems require mechanisms to restrain the potential
excesses of free will.46 While the concept seems unassailable
in the abstract or within the context of a single legal
system,47  it becomes controversial in international
arbitration because there still may be disagreements about
the justification for applying a particular country's
mandatory laws to the parties and their dispute.48
Ultimately, the issue boils down to a choice-of-law question.
While the details may be complex, the basic concept is not:
(1) tribunals have an obligation to decide cases according to
law,49 (2) states may enact laws designed to restrain free
will,5" and (3) those laws must prevail over contrary
agreements whenever those laws apply by their own terms
and their application also has been validated by the
relevant choice-of-law rules.5 In other words, mandatory
policy or statutory law will in some circumstances override an otherwise valid
choice-of-law agreement."); LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-16, at 112 ("A principle
found almost universally in systems of private international law the world-over
is that the ordinary rules to determine applicable law can be ousted insofar as a
matter is characterised as involving the rules of 'mandatory application' of the
State whose courts are called upon to determine these matters.").
46. See Hochstrasser, supra note 8, at 85 ("Just as the freedom of contract, in
even the most liberal legal system, finds its limits at certain mandatory rules,
the freedom of choice of law, which is nothing more than a different expression
of the freedom of contract on the international level, finds its limits at the
mandatory and applicable rules of law affected by an international
agreement.").
47. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 284-85 ("[No] one would hold an arbitrator in
a purely domestic dispute to be exempt from the duty of applying rules whose
sole purpose is to defend the public interest. Naturally, it may be said that in
the context of domestic arbitration the applicability of one single system of law
is ex hypothesi evident .... ).
48. See id. at 286 ("If one allows that arbitrators may not systematically
disregard mandatory rules of law even when originating outside the lex
contractus, it remains to be determined which ones they should in fact apply.").
49. BORN, supra note 8, at 2183, 2192, 2196.
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
51. As a leading observer explains:
[Tihe better view is that the "foreign" mandatory law will apply only if
both the requirements of the foreign mandatory law and relevant
conflicts rules provide for the application of the foreign law. That is
because it is the conflicts rules applicable to the parties' dispute-and
not the unilateral definitions of foreign legal systems-which must
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laws do not prevail over contrary agreements because they
claim peremptory status for themselves,52 but because the
relevant conflicts-of-law rules validate their application in
the particular case.
Returning to the Article's opening scenario,53  the
tribunal may apply European competition law without
regard to the contractual selection of New York law if the
SBO arrangements cause substantial anticompetitive
effects in EU member states (thus triggering European
competition law by its own terms),54 and if the relevant
conflicts-of-law rules also validate the claims of European
competition law.55
II. CATALYSTS
Having adopted a legal justification that better
reconciles mandatory laws with widely held views about the
limits of party autonomy, one may begin to explore three
catalysts likely to affect the disposition of arbitrators
towards the application of a particular mandatory law.
These include (1) the place of arbitration, (2) the relevant
define the circumstances in which a choice-of-law clause will be
overridden.
BORN, supra note 8, at 2192.
52. See Case No. 6320 of 1992, Final Award, 6 ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull., no. 1,
May 1995 at 59, 62 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) ("[E]ven if a particular state does claim
the mandatory extraterritorial application of its laws, that-by itself-is not
sufficient to lead to the mandatory application of such laws in international
arbitration."); Mayer, supra note 7, at 286 ("It is not sufficient that ... the State
having promulgated [the rule of mandatory law] declares it to be applicable.").
But see Mistelis, supra note 3, at 292 (describing mandatory laws in terms of "a
category of express (positive) rules which provides for its own scope of
application" (emphasis added)).
53. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
54. See Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 82, 90
(holding that European competition law did not exclude application to overseas
conduct that had the effect of creating or strengthening a dominant position
that impedes competition in the European Common Market); Dolmans &
Grierson, supra note 30, at 45-46 (noting that European competition law is
applicable to any agreement that has substantial anticompetitive effects in the
EU).
55. As explained below, different conflicts-of-law rules may vary substantially
in their tendency to validate the claims of mandatory law. See infra notes 71-77
and accompanying text.
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choice-of-law rules, and (3) the selection of institutional
rules.
A. Place of Arbitration
Starting with the place of arbitration, one may identify
four likely effects on a tribunal's inclination to apply
mandatory rules. First, courts at the place of arbitration
have the power to set awards aside for violations of public
policy, 6 which then becomes a ground to refuse enforcement
in third states under Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention. 7 In this regard, one should recall that most
courts seem keen to defend their own states' mandatory
laws, but show much less enthusiasm in defending the
mandatory laws of other states.58 Cognizant of this fact,
tribunals may feel particularly inclined to apply the
mandatory laws of the arbitral seat.59
56. See Voser, supra note 4, at 333 ("[I]f an arbitral tribunal renders an
award which violates public policy, it risks that the award may be challenged at
the place of arbitration.").
57. New York Convention, supra note 37, art. V(1)(e) (authorizing courts to
refuse enforcement of an award that "has been set aside . . . by a competent
authority of the country in which . . . that award was made"); see also Voser,
supra note 4, at 333 (indicating that, while not absolutely required by Article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, the setting aside of an award at the place of
arbitration usually prevents enforcement of awards in third states).
58. See Hanotiau, supra note 17, at 397 ("If state courts are inclined to apply
the forum policy laws, even if the lex contractus does not coincide with the lex
fori, they are very reluctant to apply policy laws of a foreign legal system.");
Mayer, supra note 7, at 282-83 ("Judges are quite ready.., to apply their own
country's mandatory rules of law . . . . On the other hand, the possibility of
making such an exception in favour of mandatory rules of a foreign law is met
with far greater reluctance.'); see also LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-25 to 6-26
(noting that courts invariably apply the mandatory laws of their own
jurisdictions, but that judicial "application of foreign mandatory law is a very
different matter"); Bernard Audit, How Do Mandatory Rules of Law Function in
International Civil Litigation?, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 53, 65 ("A national court will normally be
reluctant to displace its own law in order to comply with a foreign mandatory
rule."); van Houtte, supra note 30, at 67 ("[A] judge is less preoccupied with the
advancement of policies of a foreign state than with the application of the proper
law.").
59. See Voser, supra note 4, at 334 ("If a state... allow[s] the challenge to an
arbitral award that was rendered in its territory on the basis of its own ...
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Second, perhaps for the reason just stated, observers
often refer to a generic presumption favoring application of
the seat's mandatory laws, at least if the parties or their
transaction bears a close relationship to that jurisdiction.6"
Third, even when policing the application of their own
mandatory laws, courts apply different standards of review.
Thus, U.S. courts pause only to ensure that arbitrators have
applied local mandatory laws without regard to the quality
of analysis.6 ' Increasing the level of scrutiny, French courts
review awards for obvious misapplications of local
mandatory laws.62 Taking things a step further, the Dutch
public policy, the arbitrator may be inclined to respect the mandatory rules of
the law of th[at] state ....").
60. See GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 5.04, at 168 (James J. Fawcett ed., 2004) ("One clear-cut
conclusion that emerges from arbitral practice is that international arbitrators
strive to give effect to mandatory provisions of the law of the seat of the
arbitration, if their violation might leave the award open to be set aside in that
state."); Shore, supra note 18, at 131 ("Arbitrators must apply mandatory rules
of the seat of arbitration. This is, in most circles, accepted."); Voser, supra note
4, at 338 ("[I]n practice there is a tendency to favor mandatory rules of... the
seat of arbitration."). However, another leading observer cautions against the
automatic application of the seat's mandatory laws because that jurisdiction
may have little to do with the parties or the underlying dispute. BORN, supra
note 8, at 2187; see also Audit, supra note 58, at 60 ("[T]he purpose of [a]
particular domestic mandatory rule might not call for its application in
transnational situations, [for example] where the substance of the transaction
has no relation to the forum."); Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 224
(arguing against the application of the seat's mandatory laws when the
disputing parties have only tenuous connections to the jurisdiction and have
chosen the location "purely for convenience"); Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 31,
at 18 ("[T]he arbitrators' power . . . to apply competition law will as a rule not
derive from the law of the seat of the arbitration, since that law will not
mandate the application of the local competition law if the relationship
submitted to arbitration has no effects on the markets of that country.").
61. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 315 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir.
2003). In Baxter, the Seventh Circuit held that judicial review of arbitral awards
only goes as far as ascertaining whether the tribunal "took cognizance" of U.S.
antitrust claims and "actually decided them." Id. Furthermore, the court
indicated that plenary review of the arbitrators' decisions on antitrust claims
"would throw the result [of the arbitration] in the waste basket," which "would
be just another way of saying that antitrust matters are not arbitrable." Id.
62. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2628-30 nn.396, 402 (citing a French Court of
Cassation decision for the proposition that violations of public policy must be
"flagrant and have material effect" to justify the annulment of arbitral awards,
as well as a Paris Court of Appeal decision for the proposition that a "manifest"
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Hague Court of Appeal has applied a de novo standard of
review to questions of local mandatory law.63 Given the vast
differences in approach by national courts, tribunals may
devote more or less attention to local mandatory laws
depending on the anticipated level of judicial review at the
seat of arbitration.
Fourth, while no longer a universal rule,' many
arbitrators still presumptively apply the seat's conflicts-of-
violation of European competition law would justify annulment of arbitral
awards). Another well-known commentator has explained that the violation of
mandatory law "must be so blatant as to 'knock your eyes out"' in order to
"attract judicial notice" in France. Rau, supra note 24, at 115 & n.94. French
courts follow a similar approach in proceedings to enforce foreign arbitral
awards. See SNF SAS v. Cytec Indus. BV, Judgment of Mar. 23, 2006, 23 Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 282, 288 (Paris Ct. App.) (requiring parties to prove a "flagrant,
effective and concrete violation of international public policy" to justify refusal
to enforce foreign awards). Because "alleged violations of competition law are, by
their very nature, rarely blatant," this standard of review implies that French
courts will almost never set aside awards based on incompatibility with
European competition law. Denis Bensaude, Thales Air Defence BV v. GIE
Euromissile: Defining the Limits of Scrutiny of Awards Based on Alleged
Violations of European Competition Law, 22 J. INT'L ARB. 239, 243 (2005).
63. Mktg. Displays Int'l v. VR Van Raalte Reclame BV, Judgment of Mar. 24,
2005, 31 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 808, 816 (Hague Gerechtshof) ("[A] national court
must grant a request for annulment of an arbitral award - when, in its opinion,
that award is indeed in conflict with [European competition law]." (emphasis
added)); see also BORN, supra note 8, at 2630 ("[T]here are commentators who
urge, and national courts which apply, significantly more extensive judicial
review of arbitrators' mandatory law and public policy decisions, on the grounds
that this is necessary to safeguard underlying public values." (footnotes
omitted)). But see Alexis Mourre & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Towards
Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back, 23 J. INT'L
ARB. 171, 185 (2006) (describing the Dutch judgment in Marketing Displays as "a
deplorable step back" which "clearly demonstrates the serious drawbacks of the
intrusive review of awards by national courts"). Some observers have
interpreted the European Court of Justice's decision in the Eco Swiss case to
require the courts of EU member states not only to ensure that arbitrators
apply European competition law, but that they do so "properly," an assessment
that suggests de novo review. See, e.g., LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-88, at 147.
64. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2123; John R. Crook, Applicable Law in
International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 278, 283 (1989) (explaining that applying the seat's conflicts-of-law rules
"holds far less sway . . . today than once it did"); Voser, supra note 4, at 340
("Even though some scholars still view [applying the seat's conflicts-of-law rules]
as the 'usual rule,' . . . the obligation to apply the private international law of
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law rules.65 As already noted, the relevant conflicts-of-law
rules play an important role in validating the application of
mandatory laws.66  Furthermore, as explained below,
European conflicts rules may skew more towards validating
the application of mandatory law than their U.S.
counterparts, at least in particular cases." For this reason,
the seat of arbitration can affect the tribunal's disposition to
apply mandatory laws.
Aggregating the foregoing observations, arbitration in a
particular forum generally supports the application of that
jurisdiction's mandatory laws. More specifically, arbitration
in an EU member state seems likely to trigger the
application of European competition law, 8 at least in cases
where a party or the transaction has a close connection to
that jurisdiction.69 Thus, returning to this Article's opening
scenario,70  the respondent's invocation of European
the arbitral tribunal's seat can safely be assigned to the history of international
commercial arbitration.").
65. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2127 ("Arbitrators continue in many cases to
apply the choice-of-law rules of the arbitral seat ...."); Crook, supra note 64, at
283 (opining that this view "retains energetic supporters"); Hans Smit, The
Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational
Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 22-23 (1986) (describing this
approach as the "usual rule"); Voser, supra note 4, at 340 ("[A]rbitrators still
seem to apply [this rule] in practice."). But see Mayer, supra note 7, at 284 ("No
rule of conflict of laws is imperative as to arbitrators."). It goes without saying
that arbitrators will be more likely to favor the seat's conflicts-of-law rules if
they adhere to the "jurisdictional" theory of arbitration, or the view that
proceedings remain anchored in the legal system prevailing at the place of
arbitration. Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 210. Arbitrators who
prefer a "delocalized" approach will be less likely to apply the seat's conflicts-of-
law rules. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, 1 3.74 (describing the theory of
delocalization, which seeks "to detach an international commercial arbitration
from control by the law of the place in which it is held").
66. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
68. See van Houtte, supra note 30, at 65 ("[A]rbitrators have to apply
[European] competition law when the seat of the arbitration is located within
the European Union. It is part of the public policy of the country where they
perform their duties ....").
69. See id. ("Arbitrators sitting within the E.U. may have additional grounds
to apply European competition law, for instance, because ... the case is closely
linked with an E.U. country.").
70. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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competition law may prevail in arbitrations seated on one
side of the Atlantic, but seems less likely to succeed in
arbitrations seated on the other side of the Atlantic.
B. Conflicts-of-Law Rules
Turning from the place of arbitration to the relevant
choice-of-law rules, certain approaches seem more likely to
validate the application of foreign mandatory law. With
respect to contracts concluded through December 17, 2009,
the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (in effect for EU member states)7 ' permits the
application of foreign mandatory laws having a "close
connection" to the "situation."72 According to this approach,
71. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Oct.
9, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1. As explained by Landolt, the Rome Convention was
only open to ratification by EU member states and was, in fact, ultimately
ratified by all EU member states. LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-29. Article 7(1),
the relevant provision on mandatory laws, states that "effect may be given to
the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has
a close connection .. " Rome Convention, supra, art. 7(1). However, the Rome
Convention also permits state parties to opt out of Article 7(1). Id. art. 22(1)(a).
This step has been taken by Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United
Kingdom. BELOHLAVEK, supra note 9, 09.138; BORN, supra note 8, at 2176;
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 17, § 1516, at 848; Grigera Na6n,
supra note 4, at 208 n.196; see also Audit, supra note 58, at 70 (noting that
Germany, Luxemburg and the U.K. availed themselves of that possibility).
72. Rome Convention, supra note 71, art. 7(1). One should emphasize that
this provision permits (but does not require) the application of foreign
mandatory laws. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2176. As such, it leaves tribunals
with a substantial degree of discretion. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-32
(emphasizing that the Rome Convention grants courts considerable discretion to
decide whether they will apply foreign mandatory laws, as well as the "effect" to
give them once applied); Bermann, supra note 4, at 12 ("[The] Rome Convention
made the forum's application of a third state's mandatory rules of law
essentially discretionary."); Shore, supra note 18, at 142 ("The very breadth of
Article 7.1 . . . is expressly intended . . . to give a power of discretion to
judges ...."). This discretion may depend on subjective impressions about the
"nature and purpose" of foreign mandatory laws, as well as predictions about
the "consequences of their application or non-application." Rome Convention,
supra note 71, art. 7(1). The breadth of discretion may not be "particularly
reassuring for parties involved in international commerce, for whom
predictability is an important consideration." FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN,
supra note 17, § 1522, at 853; see also BELOHLAVEK, supra note 9, 09.142, at
1511 (explaining that the United Kingdom opposed the wording of Article 7(1)
on the grounds that it "leads to great legal uncertainty for no reason");
Sheppard, supra note 7, at 180 (explaining that the U.K. delegation opposed
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the satisfaction of a single, modest criterion (a "close
connection") triggers the tribunal's discretion to apply
mandatory law. Thus, European conflicts-of-law rules
traditionally have invited the application of foreign
mandatory laws.
By contrast, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws represents the traditional point of departure across
the Atlantic. According to section 187(2), contractual choices
of law have no effect to the extent that they contradict a
"fundamental policy" of a state which (1) has a "materially
greater interest" in determination of the issue,74 and (2) has
the "most significant relationship"75 to the parties and their
transaction, a cumulation of demanding criteria that
seems to discourage the application of mandatory laws.77
To be sure, intervening developments have rendered it
more difficult to generalize about the differences between
European and U.S. conflicts rules. For contracts concluded
after December 17, 2009, the Rome I Regulation supersedes
the Rome Convention.7" While preserving a wide scope for
the application of non-derogable laws in the employment79
Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention because its text created "a recipe for
confusion [and] uncertainty . . . " (quoting DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 32-143, at 1593 (Sir Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 14th ed.
2006))).
73. Landolt has indicated that the vagueness of the "close connection"
standard reinforces the discretion of courts in deciding whether to apply foreign
mandatory laws. LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-33. Arbitrators not inclined to
apply foreign mandatory laws over the will of the parties may, for example, use
their discretion to demand a particularly close connection to justify the
application of foreign mandatory laws. Id. 6-70, at 138.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (emphasis
added).
75. Id. § 188(1) (emphasis added).
76. Id. § 187(2) (incorporating § 188).
77. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2177 (emphasizing the Restatement's more
restrictive approach towards mandatory law).
78. Regulation No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I),
arts. 24, 28, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 15, 16 (EC) [hereinafter Rome I Regulation]; see
also Shore, supra note 18, at 143-44.
79. Rome I Regulation, supra note 78, art. 8(1) ("An individual employment
contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties .... Such a choice of
law may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the
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and consumer fields,8 ° the new regulation restricts their
application in other fields. For example, the regulation
draws a distinction between "provisions which cannot be
derogated from by agreement" and a narrower category of
"overriding mandatory provisions."" According to the
Regulation, these "overriding mandatory provisions"
represent a more restrictive concept involving "provisions
the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social
or economic organization, to such an extent that they are
applicable to any situation falling within their scope,
irresective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract
With respect to "provisions . . . which cannot be
derogated from by agreement," a contractual choice of law
will not prevent the application of EU law or the national
law of another jurisdiction if "all other elements relevant to
the situation at the time of the choice" were located in an
EU member state or in the other jurisdiction, respectively. 3
According to commentary, this provision serves to prevent
the evasion of non-derogable norms in "purely domestic
cases."
84
With respect to "overriding mandatory provisions," a
contractual choice of law will not prevent application of (1)
the forum's own laws; or (2) those of another "country where
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have
been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory
provisions render the performance of the contract
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated ... under the
law that.., would have been applicable .... ).
80. Id. art. 6(2) ("Such a choice may not.., have the result of depriving the
consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be
derogated .... ).
81. Id. recital 37.
82. Id. art. 9; see also Shore, supra note 18, at 144 (describing the Rome I
Regulation's more restrictive approach to overriding mandatory provisions).
83. Rome I Regulation, supra note 78, art. 3(3) (other jurisdiction); id. art.
3(4) (EU Member State).
84. Dennis Solomon, The Private International Law of Contracts in Europe:
Advances and Retreats, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1727 (2008).
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unlawful."85 Thus, by adopting a restrictive definition of
"overriding mandatory provisions" and by limiting their
geographic scope to the forum and to the place of
performance, the EU's newest conflicts rules appear to
signal a retreat from the application of mandatory laws, 6
and towards the more restrictive approach codified in the
Restatement. 7
Although it may have become more difficult to
generalize about the differences between European and U.S.
conflicts rules, the point is that differences remain clear and
substantial for particular situations. For example, given the
timing involved in this Article's opening scenario (long
antedating the effective date for the Rome I Regulation), the
tribunal would have to choose between the Rome
Convention and the Restatement as the source of the
relevant conflicts rules. Selection of the Rome Convention
seems likely to encourage the application of European
competition law, whereas selection of the Restatement
seems likely to discourage it.
Before leaving the topic of conflicts-of-law rules, one
should pause to observe that recourse to arbitration may
itself enhance the prospects for applying mandatory law. 8
85. Rome I Regulation, supra note 78, art. 9; see also Shore, supra note 18, at
144 (noting that the "overriding mandatory provisions" of the Rome I Regulation
refer only to the law of the forum and the law of the country of performance).
86. See BELOHLAVEK, supra note 9, 09.141 to 09.142 (describing the Rome
I Regulation as a compromise designed to appeal to member states that wanted
to restrict the scope of mandatory laws in order to enhance party autonomy and
legal certainty); Audit, supra note 58, at 70 ("[T]he Rome I Regulation has
retreated from the position of the Convention."). More specifically, the Rome I
Regulation seems to embrace the narrow British view that gives judges
discretion only to invalidate contracts that would be unlawful at the place of
performance. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-40 (describing the English
approach to foreign mandatory laws). But see Sheppard, supra note 7, at 179
n.24 (indicating that Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation has an effect similar to
Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention, "albeit with some changes in wording").
87. See Audit, supra note 58, at 70 (discussing the Rome I Regulation and
concluding that "there is nothing here very different from what could already be
found in the Restatement... ").
88. See supra note 4 (describing opposing trends, in which arbitrators
increasingly apply mandatory laws without regard to contractual choices of law,
but national courts are retreating from the application of mandatory laws).
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Building on French legal traditions89 and ICC practice,9" all
major international arbitration rules now authorize
tribunals to "apply the rules of law [that they determine] to
be appropriate" in the absence of a contractual choice.9 As
a result, tribunals have the discretion to choose an
"appropriate" substantive law directly, without having to
perform a conflicts analysis or even "explain or justify
[their] findings regarding the law or legal rules governing
the merits."92 Assuming their willingness to exercise that
discretion, tribunals might free themselves from the
restraining criteria found in certain national conflicts rules
and, thus, increase their leeway to secure the application of
mandatory laws.93
One should, however, bear in mind three qualifications
regarding the direct selection of substantive law. First, that
possibility only appears in the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules as of the July 2010 amendments,94  which
89. BORN, supra note 8, at 2117, 2136; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4,
3.222; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, 6.66.
90. BORN, supra note 8, at 2118, 2136.
91. ICC RULES, supra note 29, art. 17(1) ("In the absence of any . . .
agreement [by the parties], the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law
which it determines to be appropriate."); see also INT'L CTR. FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION & AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, IN-TERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES art. 28(1) (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6449
("Failing... a designation by the parties, the tribunal shall apply such law(s) or
rules of law as it determines to be appropriate."); U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010), G.A. Res. 65/22, art.
35(1), U.N. Doc. A165/17 (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules] ("Failing
... designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it
determines to be appropriate."). LCIA Arbitration Rules, LONDON COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, art. 22.3 (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.lcia.org/
DisputeResolutionServices/LCIAArbitrationRules.aspx ("If... The Arbitral
Tribunal decides the parties have made no . . . choice [of law], the Arbitral
Tribunal shall apply the law(s) or rules of law which it considers appropriate").
92. Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 213.
93. See id. at 216 ("[Tlhe wide notion of 'appropriateness' found in Article
17(1) of the 1998 ICC Rules do[es] not exclude [the] possibility [of applying
mandatory laws] when the parties have not stipulated the applicable law
governing the merits.").
94. Compare UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 91, art. 35(1), with U.N. Comm'n
on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 33(1)
(Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf ("Failing such designation by the parties, the
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presumptively apply only to contracts concluded after
August 15, 2010." Thus, for many contracts in force as of
this writing, direct selection of the substantive law will not
be available to tribunals operating under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules.
Second, while perhaps well established in French legal
circles, 96 some arbitrators regard the direct selection of
substantive laws as subjective and unpredictable, 97 and
therefore inappropriate.98 As a result, they continue to apply
national conflicts-of-law rules on the theory that the
resulting selection of substantive law rules represents the
most "appropriate" choice. 99
Third, and perhaps most importantly, arbitration rules
authorize the direct selection of substantive laws only in the
absence of contractual choices of law. 00 Therefore, if the
parties have selected the applicable law by contract,
arbitration rules do not expressly permit the arbitrators to
engage in the direct selection of competing mandatory laws.
However, to the extent that one of the disputing parties
challenges a contractual selection of law as invalid in the
particular case, the arbitration rules would then authorize
the tribunal to engage in direct selection of the legal rules to
judge the validity of the contractual choice, which might
bring into play the mandatory laws of another state. '0
tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules that it
considers applicable.").
95. See UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 91, art. 1(2).
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
97. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2137 (criticizing direct selection of the
applicable law because it "leaves the parties' substantive rights to turn on
subjective, unarticulated instincts" of arbitrators); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE,
supra note 6, 1 6.65 ('"The approach has been criticized because of the
uncertainty that can occur."); Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 213 ("It is difficult
to conceive of choice-of-law rules more flexible and open-ended or imposing
lesser limitations on the authority of ... arbitrators.").
98. BORN, supra note 8, at 2137.
99. See id. at 2142.
100. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 91.
101. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2183 & n.365 (noting that the arbitrators'
mandate may require adjudication of claims that "contractual arrangements are
invalid, unlawful, or otherwise contrary to public policy," which may open the
door to consideration of mandatory laws).
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C. Institutional Rules
Turning from conflicts-of-law rules to the procedural
rules for conducting arbitrations, one may identify a
number of factors that arguably encourage the application
of mandatory law in proceedings conducted under the ICC
Rules. For example, among the leading arbitration
institutions, the ICC has distinguished itself by expressing
positive views about the application of mandatory laws.
Thus, as early as 1980, an ICC working group issued draft
recommendations confirming the authority of arbitrators to
apply mandatory laws in circumstances broadly similar to
those contemplated by the Rome Convention."2 Four years
later, the ICC's Executive Board approved a "Report of the
Joint Working Party on Arbitration and Competition,"
which disclaimed any wish "to serve as a substitute for the
arbitrators themselves," but which nevertheless stated that
"the International Chamber of Commerce takes up the same
position as that expressed by the Commission" of the
European Communities regarding the circumstances calling
for the mandatory application of European competition
law.' 3 Later that same year, when appearing as amicus
curiae before the United States Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,"
102. See id. at 2183 n.365 (discussing the draft recommendations of a working
group of the ICC Commission on Law and Commercial Practices).
103. Brief of the International Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 36
n.34, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(Nos. 83-1569, 83-1733), 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1613 [hereinafter ICC
Brief] (quoting a document referred to as ICC Doc. No. 420/259, Report of the
Joint Working Party on Arbitration and Competition at 4-5 (Apr. 6, 1984)).
104. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). In its brief, the ICC expressed its view that the
arbitrators would likely apply U.S. antitrust law despite a choice-of-law clause
providing that the relevant contract would be "governed by" the laws of
Switzerland "in all respects ... as if entirely performed therein." Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 637 n.19; ICC Brief, supra note 103, at *39. For additional
discussion of the brief from the ICC's perspective, see generally Sigvard Jarvin,
Correspondence, Mitsubishi Again-an ICC Comment, 4 J. INT'L ARB., no. 1,
1987 at 87. Mr. Jarvin was General Counsel to the ICC Court of Arbitration. Id.
at 89.
When one compares the ICC's amicus brief to that of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"), one may better appreciate the ICC's unusually
strong perspective on mandatory law. Both of the arbitration institutions
reassured the Supreme Court that arbitration of antitrust claims for
international transactions would not undermine the enforcement of U.S.
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the ICC horrified some members of the arbitration bar by
appearing to endorse the view that a Japanese tribunal
should apply U.S. antitrust law to a dispute involving U.S.,
Japanese, and Swiss parties, notwithstanding an express
contractual choice of Swiss law." 5
In addition to having institutional views on the
application of mandatory laws, the ICC possesses the tools
required to ensure that arbitrators consider those views in
appropriate cases. Almost uniquely in the field, the ICC
reserves the right under its arbitration rules to scrutinize
and comment on draft awards,' 6 a power that it exercises in
antitrust laws. In staking out its position, the AAA emphasized its commitment
to the principle of party autonomy by criticizing the lower courts for
"disregard[ing] the parties' autonomous choice of arbitration under a foreign
governing law (Swiss) and in a foreign location (Japan) .... ." Brief for the
American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
*11, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (No. 83-1569), 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1614 [hereinafter AAA
Brief]. However, the AAA argued that enforcement of the parties' agreement
would not undermine U.S. competition policy because "both the United States
Government and affected third parties retain[ed] at all times a right of action to
redress any injury to competition in United States domestic or foreign commerce
.... " Id. at *13; see also id. at *47 ("The antitrust enforcement authorities of the
United States Government are free at all times to initiate proceedings to enforce
the antitrust laws."). By contrast, the ICC emphasized its commitment to the
application of mandatory laws by predicting that the arbitrators would apply
U.S. antitrust law regardless of the parties' contractual selection of Swiss law.
See ICC Brief, supra note 103, at *38 ("U.S. antitrust policy will, of course, be
vindicated when an arbitrator applies the law of the United States to resolve the
claim.").
105. See, e.g., Werner, supra note 14, at 83 (opining that the ICC's position
"came as a bad surprise to many long-time users of ICC arbitration," and
suggesting that the decision would impose costs on party autonomy that the
users of international arbitration could not afford to pay). But see Jarvin, supra
note 104, at 88 (explaining that the ICC only forecast what the arbitral tribunal
was likely to do, and "did not express an opinion of what it wished the
arbitrators to do").
106. See ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 27. To the author's knowledge, the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC")
represents the only other major administering institution that follows a similar
practice. See Arbitration Rules, CIETAC, art. 45 (May 1, 2005),
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (follow "Rules" hyperlink). Supporters view
institutional scrutiny as a form of quality control that can be useful when
seeking enforcement of awards. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, 1 9.209
("[T]he scrutiny process acts as a measure of quality control . . . ."); MOSES,
supra note 4, at 186 ('The purpose of the scrutiny is to ensure that the form of
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nearly all cases."°7 In so doing, the ICC explicitly states in
Article 6 of its Internal Rules, that it will consider "the
requirements of mandatory law at the place of
arbitration."'10 8  Furthermore, in accordance with
unpublished guidelines adopted in September 1998, the ICC
also considers mandatory laws at "possible places of
enforcement" when scrutinizing draft awards.' 9 Given these
internal rules and guidelines, observers have concluded that
selection of ICC arbitration provides "some evidence of
consent" to the application of mandatory laws."' Perhaps
the award is appropriate, and to be able to encourage arbitrators to revise the
substantive core, if necessary."); see also Carte Blanche (Sing.) Pte. Ltd. v. Carte
Blanche Int'l, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 945, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (assigning great
significance to the fact that the ICC had scrutinized and confirmed the final
award).
Detractors regard institutional scrutiny as a time consuming and costly
process that may expose arbitrators to influences that disputing parties can
neither observe nor control. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, 1 9.208.
107. In 2009, the ICC approved 415 awards. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, 2009
Statistical Report, 21 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., no. 1, 2010 at 5, 14 [hereinafter
2009 Statistical Report]. In scrutinizing those awards, the ICC Court of
Arbitration "laid down modifications as to the form of the award and/or drew the
arbitral tribunal's attention to points of substance when approving 382 awards,
leaving 33 awards approved without commentary by the Court." Id. Thus, while
the extent of scrutiny and commentary may be greater or lesser in particular
cases, the fact is that they play a role on over 92% of awards rendered by
tribunals under the ICC Rules.
108. ICC Rules, supra note 29, app. II, art. 6.
109. Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 214 (discussing unpublished guidelines
regarding the preparation of draft arbitration awards before the ICC Court). It
is interesting to note that the ICC expresses its interest in mandatory laws
chiefly through obscure vehicles, such as internal rules, internal guidelines, and
confidential exchanges with tribunal members. See id. at 214-16. There have
been proposals to modify the ICC Rules so as to provide tribunals with the
express authority to disregard choice-of-law clauses in favor of mandatory laws,
id. at 216, which would have made the ICC's institutional position much more
transparent. However, in the words of Grigera Na6n, a former Secretary-
General of the ICC, those efforts "were not crowned with success." Id.
110. Barraclough & Waincymer, supra note 4, at 223; see also LANDOLT, supra
note 3, 6-53 ("[N]on-ICC awards . . . may not reflect the same degree of
concern to apply EC competition law."). But see Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at
216 ("Article 17(1) of the 1998 ICC Rules indicates that the parties are free to
determine the rules of law that the Arbitral Tribunal 'must' apply to the
substance of the dispute. Thus, any theoretical basis for the application of...
international mandatory rules by ICC tribunals must be found outside the ICC
arbitration rules themselves .... ).
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more importantly, while delicately cast in the form of
suggestions to tribunal members,"' the ICC's interventions
(or even the prospect of ICC interventions) seems likely to
color the tribunal's deliberations on mandatory laws."2
When one adds the fact that EU member states
represent the seat of arbitration for a clear majority of cases
administered under the ICC Rules,"3 it seems obvious that
a clear majority of ICC tribunals will be forced to consider
the EU's potentially relevant mandatory laws. Thus,
reverting to this Article's opening scenario,'t selection of
the ICC Rules by itself increases the chances that the
tribunal will apply European competition law without
regard to the contractual choice of New York law. Selection
of Paris as the seat would further increase the chances,
whereas selection of a Swiss venue might have a
countervailing effect."5
111. See ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 27 (indicating that the ICC's
interventions do not affect the tribunal's 'liberty of decision" on matters of
substance); Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 214 ("Although . . .the ICC Court
has no powers to impose the decision on the merits to be followed by the
arbitrators ... ,it may alert them as to the existence of public policy principles
or mandatory legal rules in the relevant national law which if not taken into
account may jeopardize the enforceability or validity of the award.").
112. See MOSES, supra note 4, at 186 (emphasizing that the expectation of
scrutiny creates incentives for arbitrators to anticipate and correct problems at
the drafting stage). Because the ICC not only scrutinizes awards, but also has
the authority to "confirm" (or not to confirm) arbitrators nominated by the
disputing parties in future cases, one would expect repeat players to give serious
consideration to the ICC's comments on matters of substance likely to affect the
enforceability of awards. See ICC Rules, supra note 29, art. 9(1)-(2) (referring to
the ICC's confirmation of persons nominated to serve as arbitrator).
113. The ICC has identified the seat of arbitration by country for 630 cases
initiated in 2009. Of those, 332 arbitrations (or 52.7%) had their seats in EU
member states. See 2009 Statistical Report, supra note 107, at 13.
114. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
115. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-91 ("[It is far less certain that a court
outside the EU will treat a failure to apply EC competition law as an
infringement of public policy . . . .Switzerland may serve as an example.");
Radicati Di Brozolo, supra note 31, at 19 ("Swiss law will not require that
arbitrators sitting in Switzerland will apply a foreign competition law."); van
Houtte, supra note 30, at 66 ("For arbitrators sitting outside the EU, European
competition law is not part of the law of the seat of the arbitration (lex arbitri).
Consequently, their award does not have to be set aside as contrary to public
policy if it would fail to apply [European competition law]. A striking example
thereof is given by a recent decision from the Tribunal Fgdral Suisse.").
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In the past, parties wishing to avoid European competition law reportedly
provided for Swiss arbitration. LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-91. In more recent
years, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has rendered a number of decisions
promoting consideration of European competition law. For example, in 1992 the
court held that arbitrators have the jurisdiction and the obligation to apply
European competition law, at least when the disputing parties are from EU
member states and one invokes the provisions of European competition law.
V SpA v. G SA, Judgment of Apr. 28, 1992, 18 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 143, 148-49
(Federal Supreme Court (Switz.)).
Six years later, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that Swiss-seated
tribunals must examine the validity of contracts in light of European
competition law when invited to do so by one of the disputing parties. X SA v. Y
SA, Judgment of Nov. 13, 1998, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Federal Supreme
Court (Switz.)). In other words, Swiss-seated tribunals must consider arguments
regarding the application of European competition law. See LANDOLT, supra note
3, 1 6-98 ("In Switzerland therefore, the position is that if a party raises EC
competition law in an arbitration, the arbitral tribunal is bound to consider this
plea." (emphasis added)).
Consistent with the jurisprudence outlined above, one Swiss-seated
tribunal applied European competition law to a dispute between U.S. and
German companies, even though the underlying contract called for the
application of New York law. LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-55 (discussing ICC
Case No. 8626); see also Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 325 (referring to "several
cases" in which Swiss-seated arbitrators have applied European competition law
despite the parties' contractual selection of Swiss law).
Whether the extra-contractual application of European competition law
represents the prevailing trend for Swiss-seated arbitrators seems less clear.
See Blessing, supra note 18, at 36 ("While the arbitral practice in Switzerland,
up to the end of the 1980s, had shown a certain reluctance to accept the
interference of antitrust law which are extractions to the lex causae, the
situation in Switzerland has clearly changed during the 1990s."). But see Serge
Lazareff, Mandatory Extraterritorial Application of National Law, 11 ARB. INT'L
137, 142 (1995) ("It is interesting to note that a minority of legal authors has
advanced the idea that arbitrators sitting in Switzerland should apply Article 19
of [the Swiss Private International Law Act], entitled 'taking into account of
mandatory provisions of foreign law.' However, this opinion is not shared by all
writers." (footnote omitted)).
To the extent that Swiss-seated arbitrators seem disposed to apply
foreign mandatory laws, the relevant Swiss statute contemplates a distinctly
narrower scope for the application of foreign mandatory laws than does the
Rome Convention. Thus, Article 19 of Swiss Private International Law Act
requires not only a "close connection" with the foreign jurisdiction, but also that
the interests of the party seeking the application of the foreign mandatory law
are "manifestly preponderant" according to "Swiss legal concepts," and that "its
application would result in an adequate decision under Swiss concepts of law."
Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987 fiber das Internationale Privatrecht
[Swiss Private International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 19 (Switz.),
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D. Conclusions
Wrapping up the discussion of catalysts, one may
conclude that the choice of the arbitral seat, the relevant
conflicts rules, and the institutional rules each have a role
in promoting (or inhibiting) the application of mandatory
laws. Taken cumulatively, they may have mutually
reinforcing effects. For example, an undertaking to arbitrate
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/2/291.de.pdf (German language). For
an English translation, see Rau, supra note 24, at 100 n.63. See also Grigera
Na6n, supra note 4, at 328 ("The wording of Article 19 is such as to permit a
narrow and subjective construction of what is . . . 'clearly overriding' [i.e.,
'manifestly preponderant'] ... according to Swiss 'views."').
Also, given the difficulties of defining when European competition law
applies, the difficulties in applying it correctly, and the grave consequences of
misapplying it (which may include the curtailment of competition), arbitrators
may seek pretexts to avoid the application of European competition law.
LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-10. Arbitrators wishing to follow this path may rely
on Article 19 of the Swiss Private International Law Act, which "grants . . . a
wide field of discretion" in determining whether to apply foreign mandatory
laws. Hochstrasser, supra note 8, at 64; see also van Houtte, supra note 30, at 67
(emphasizing that judges and arbitrators have "the largest discretion" to apply,
or not to apply, foreign mandatory laws based on a close connection between the
case and the relevant jurisdiction); cf. Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 42 ("Even in
its most concretized form, as in the Rome Convention and ... other legislative
instruments... the 'rule' regarding the application of foreign mandatory law is
still merely discretionary. . . .Thus, even when the path to application of a
foreign norm is established, courts do not feel pressed to take it.").
Swiss-seated arbitrators inclined to exercise their discretion against the
application of EU competition law might draw additional comfort from a
decision in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal expressed doubt "that the
provisions of-national or EU-competition law are among those fundamental
legal or moral principles that are recognized in all civilized countries, to the
point that their violation should be seen as a violation of public policy." X SA v.
Y SA, Judgment of Nov. 13, 1998, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Federal
Supreme Court (Switz.)); see also X S.p.A. v. Y S.r.l., Judgment of Mar. 8, 2006,
24 ASA Bull. 550, 560 (Federal Supreme Court (Switz.)) (holding that
"European or Italian competition laws do not belong to the realm of public
policy" for purposes of set aside proceedings in Switzerland).
Whatever the inclination of Swiss-seated tribunals, parties bent on
excluding any consideration of European competition law issues may achieve
that result by neglecting to raise them during the arbitral proceedings. In that
case, Swiss courts will not address competition issues in the context of judicial
review. X SA, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. at 513; LANDOLT, supra note 3, 6-98. As a
result of the Eco Swiss decision, the contrary result would apply in the courts of
EU member states. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 1 6-98; supra note 30.
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disputes with a European company in Amsterdam according
to the ICC Rules under a distribution agreement concluded
before December 17, 2009 seems likely to attract the
application of European competition law because (1) the
tribunal faces a high level of judicial review in the
Netherlands that could result in annulment of the award
and the worldwide refusal to enforce under the New York
Convention, thus spurring it towards rigorous application of
the forum's mandatory law;"1 6 (2) the Rome Convention's
likely application as the relevant conflicts rule will tend to
validate the application of mandatory law;"1 7 and (3) the
ICC's internal rules and its mechanism for scrutiny of draft
awards will further encourage rigorous application of the
forum's mandatory laws.'8
III. CONSEQUENCES
While frequently agonizing about the possible
application of mandatory laws, members of the arbitration
bar often neglect to consider the consequences of applying
mandatory laws.1 9 Reverting to this Article's opening
scenario, let us assume that the tribunal applies European
competition law. Let us also make the heroic assumption
that it regards the SBO provisions as incompatible with
European competition law.2° That cannot be the end of the
story because a number of questions remain 2 ': Does the
116. See supra notes 56-59, 63 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text; see also LANDOLT, supra
note 3, 6-50 ("Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention is particularly influential in
arbitrations having their seat within the EU.").
118. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
119. See BORN, supra note 8, at 2185 ("[The arbitral tribunal must first
determine which state's mandatory law... it should apply and thereafter what
the effect of that mandatory law . . . is." (emphasis added)). While Mr. Born's
treatise does not in fact examine that critical second step, it at least identifies
the need to do so. Other leading treatises do not. Cf. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 4, I 3.128 to 3.135; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, 6.21 to
6.22.
120. In the real-life dispute between BPA and Repsol, the tribunal apparently
found no violation of EU competition law. See COMPASS LEXECON, supra note 27,
at 7; KING & SPALDING, supra note 27, at 15.
121. See van Houtte, supra note 30, at 71 ("Awards seldom are limited to a
declaration that a clause or a contract is null and void [under European
competition law]. They also have to draw the consequences of this nullity.").
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violation of European competition law invalidate only the
SBO arrangements or the entire contract, so that the
distributor can walk away from its obligations with respect
to all future performance? If the violation invalidates the
entire contract and the distributor can walk away from
future performance, can it likewise refuse to pay for
previous deliveries of LNG? Whatever the fate of other
provisions, must the distributor still share the SBO
premiums already generated by diverted LNG sales, or may
it retain the benefits of its unfaithful conduct?
While it may come as a surprise to a U.S. audience,
European competition law answers none of the foregoing
questions. To the contrary, decisions by the European Court
of Justice firmly establish that a violation of European
competition law only nullifies the offending contractual
provision.122 All other consequences are determined by the
lex causae;'23 in this case, the parties' contractual selection
of New York law.'24
122. See, e.g., Case 56/65, Soci6t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm
GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 252; see also LANDOLT, supra note 3, 10-23.
123. Case 319/82, Soci6t6 de Vente de Ciments et B6tons de l'Est SA v. Kerpen
& Kerpen GmbH & Co. KG, 1983 E.C.R. 4173, 4184 12 ("The consequences of
such nullity for other parts of the agreement . . . are not a matter for
Community law. Those consequences are to be determined by the national court
according to its own law."); Case No. 7673 of 1993, Partial Award, 6 ICC Int'l Ct.
Arb. Bull. 57, 59 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) (holding that arbitrators must resolve the
legal consequences of violations of European competition law by applying "the
substantive [national] law applicable to the issue at hand"); LANDOLT, supra
note 3, 10-41, at 342 ("EU law is by and large silent on the private law
consequences of violations of [European] competition law. These consequences
are therefore governed by the lex causae."). For example, while the "Community
legal order" mandates the existence of a remedy for violations of European
competition law, the measure of damages remains a question governed by the
relevant national law. LANDOLT, supra note 3, 10-32.
124. See LANDOLT, supra note 3, 10-23, at 336 ("It is more accurate to say that
those consequences are to be determined by the lex causae, more specifically, the
lex contractus, since severance is a matter of contract."); Dolmans & Grierson,
supra note 30, at 40 ("Whether the nullity of a particular clause leads to nullity
of the entire agreement is a matter to be determined under the applicable
contract law. . . ."); van Houtte, supra note 30, at 70 ('The law applicable to the
contract will determine whether the voidness of a specific contract provision
that breaches EC competition law . .. only affects that clause or whether it
extends to the whole contract[.").
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Although some jurisdictions might possibly void the
entire contract and leave the parties where they find them,
New York law takes a more forgiving stance. Thus, one
''may sever the illegal aspects" and enforce the remainder of
the contract, provided that the illegal aspects do not
represent "the main objective of the agreement."25 Applying
this standard to the Article's opening scenario, it seems
likely that the lawful (non-SBO) aspects of the supply
agreement could stand on their own.' 26 As a result, the
distributor probably cannot walk away from all future
performance of its obligations to purchase LNG.
Assuming that the legal and illegal aspects of an
agreement are not divisible, New York law still permits
restitution for the value of past performance as long as it
does not represent the "precise conduct" made unlawful by
the antitrust laws.'27 Applying this standard, it seems
125. Mark Hotel LLC v. Madison Seventy-Seventh LLC, 872 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114
(App. Div. 2009) ('Where an agreement consists in part of an unlawful objective
and in part of lawful objectives, a court may sever the illegal aspects of the
agreement and enforce the legal ones, so long as the illegal aspects are
incidental to the legal aspects and are not the main objective of the agreement."
(quoting Glassman v. Pro Health Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., Inc., 865 N.Y.S.2d
295, 297 (App. Div. 2008))); Murray Walter, Inc. v. Sarkisian Bros., 486
N.Y.S.2d 396, 399 (App. Div. 1985) ('Where a promisee has thus given lawful
consideration for two promises, one legal, the other illegal, enforcement of the
lawful promise may be permitted."); N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Goodbody & Co.,
345 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (App. Div. 1973) ("A violation of federal antitrust laws may
be asserted as a defense in a state action .... However, where the antitrust
violation is collateral to the main issue in the complaint, it cannot remain as a
viable defense." (citations omitted)).
126. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959) ("[W]hile the [unlawful
portion of the] agreement between the parties could not be enforced by a court
...we do not think it inappropriate or violative of the intent of the parties to
give [the lawful sale of onions] effect even though it furnished the occasion for a
restrictive agreement .... ).
127. See Sarkisian Bros., 486 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (indicating that where the non-
enforcement of an unlawful agreement would lead to a substantial forfeiture by
one party and would allow the other party to retain the benefits of the
transaction, courts should apply principles of equity to prevent unjust
enrichment unless doing so would enforce the prohibited conduct); see also
X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v. Rivergate Corp., 634 N.E.2d 158, 161-62 (N.Y. 1994)
(recognizing that antitrust defenses in contract actions should only be upheld to
avoid enforcement of the "precise conduct made unlawful" by antitrust statutes,
but otherwise courts should follow a policy of avoiding unjust enrichment
(quoting Kelly, 358 U.S. at 520)).
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unlikely that the respondent can refuse to pay outstanding
balances on regular deliveries of LNG. However, the
outcome might be different if the parties had chosen the law
of another jurisdiction. 28
The most difficult determination for the tribunal will
involve the allocation of SBO premiums generated by
previously diverted LNG sales-a topic on which the
arbitrators face a pair of unappealing choices. Either they
must enforce the substance of the unlawful agreement in
equity to prevent the respondent's unjust enrichment, or
they must permit the respondent to retain the benefit of its
unfaithful conduct. 29 The outcome of this dilemma remains
128. See Mark H. Miller, Franchising in Texas, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 301, 325
(1983) ("Texas antitrust violations can be used to void debts or other unwanted
agreements and retain all prior delivered benefits without set-off, restitution, or
compensatory payment whatsoever.").
129. For examples of the role that equitable considerations may play in the
application of mandatory laws, see Grigera Na6n, supra note 4, at 309 n.337
("[I]nternational commercial arbitrators have taken into account whether one of
the parties would obtain an undue benefit or advantage through the application
of the loi de police."), and Hochstrasser, supra note 8, at 70 (indicating that, in
exercising their discretion to apply foreign mandatory laws, arbitrators may
consider the breach of good faith by a defendant who first waives the protection
of foreign mandatory laws in a choice-of-law clause, but later invokes the very
same rules to avoid contractual obligations). But see Radicati Di Brozolo, supra
note 31, at 21 ("The fact that the party may be reneging on an earlier . . .
agreement not to invoke competition law [is] immaterial."). Consideration of
undue advantage and bad faith seems appropriate given the fact that the "rules"
governing the application of foreign mandatory laws actually call for the
exercise of broad discretion. See supra notes 72-73, 115.
Assuming the relevance of undue advantage and good faith, one should
bear in mind that issues of foreign mandatory laws are usually raised by
defendants eager to avoid their contractual obligations. See Barraclough &
Waincymer, supra note 4, at 237 ("Most probably the party relying on the
[mandatory] rule is trying to avoid part or all of the obligations to which it freely
agreed."); Mayer, supra note 7, at 277 (noting that the issue of mandatory law
typically arises as a defense to the performance of contractual obligations). But
see BORN, supra note 8, at 2178 (asserting that "mandatory laws or public policy
can also be important in international arbitration because it can provide the
basis for. . . affirmative claim[s]," including antitrust claims).
Perhaps one should also bear in mind that "antitrust claims arising in
contractual disputes are often frivolous." AAA Brief, supra note 104, at *43; see
also Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25 (S.D.N.Y.)
("Numerous cases are filed in the federal district courts attempting to make
antitrust claims out of what are, at most, contract claims .... Such claims are
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unclear: On the one hand, the United States Supreme Court
and the New York Court of Appeals generally refuse to
issue judgments that would enforce the "precise conduct"
made unlawful by antitrust statutes.'3 ° On the other hand,
both courts have expressed distaste for the interposition of
antitrust defenses by defendants eager to avoid their
contractual obligations.'31 Furthermore, the New York Court
of Appeals has emphasized the need to consider "the
equities of the parties" and to "avoid upholding antitrust
defenses in contract cases where doing so would work a
substantial forfeiture on one party while unjustly enriching
the other."'32 In so doing, the Court of Appeals has
suggested an openness to the strategy of discouraging both
unjust enrichment and anticompetitive practices by (1)
holding defendants to their contractual obligations, but (2)
permitting the development of antitrust issues through
statutory remedies or public enforcement actions. '33
New York courts have also observed that substantial
performance by one party "critically affects" the decision to
refuse enforcement on the grounds of illegality.' Thus,
where one party has performed its obligations, where
refusal to enforce a contract would result in a "substantial
forfeiture" by the performing party and would confer
substantial benefits on an equally culpable counter-party,
New York courts have sometimes estopped the assertion of
illegality defenses.'35 For example, in the distant past, one
New York court reasoned:
It is urged . . . upon the part of the defendant, that the contract
which was entered into ... with the plaintiff was void, because it
was part of a corrupt and wicked conspiracy against the law and
regularly dismissed, however, after taking up considerable amounts of judicial
time."), affld, 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
130. Kelly, 358 U.S. at 520; X.L.O. Concrete Corp., 634 N.E.2d at 161.
131. Kelly, 358 U.S. at 518-19; X.L.O. Concrete Corp., 634 N.E.2d at 161.
132. X.L.O. Concrete Corp., 634 N.E.2d at 162 (citations omitted).
133. See id. ("[Plublic policy in favor of frustrating or discouraging
[anticompetitive] schemes ... must not be deprecated. However, such a danger
is reduced where statutory remedies exist and the State Attorney-General can
directly attack the alleged antitrust violations.").
134. Murray Walter, Inc. v. Sarkisian Bros., 486 N.Y.S.2d 396, 399 (App. Div.
1985).
135. See id.
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public policy of this state, in that it was a combination of
manufacturers, for the purpose of putting up the price of goods
and down the price of wages. In view of the fact that the
defendant retained the price which was paid for his corrupt and
wicked agreement, it is difficult to see how he can claim that he
should be absolved from its obligations, or how he can claim, being
a party to the instrument, and having received that which he
considered an adequate consideration for the restraints which
were put upon his volition, that such restraint should be removed,
and he be permitted to enjoy the fruits of what he claims to be his
unlawful agreement. We do not think that the defendant is in a
position to attack this contract, certainly not with its fruits in his
pocket. 136
Although these precedents do not establish an airtight
case for requiring the respondent to share the SBO
premiums already generated by diverted LNG sales, they
give the claimant a fighting chance to persuade an arbitral
tribunal that may be concerned about issues of undue
benefit and good faith.' 37 Under these circumstances, it
remains unclear how a tribunal might allocate the
previously earned SBO premiums. However, the point is
that the tribunal must do so in accordance with the law
chosen by the parties, namely New York law. In other
words, the fighting ground in this case remains under party
control.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the contrast between the theory of party
autonomy and the practice of applying mandatory law
seems less stark than anticipated. Even within legal
systems strongly oriented towards principles of autonomy,
one finds peremptory norms designed to restrain the
excesses of free will. While there may be fundamental
136. Nat'l Wall Paper Co. v. Hobbs, 35 N.Y.S. 932, 933 (App. Div. 1895); see
also Bonta v. Gridley, 78 N.Y.S. 961, 963-64 (App. Div. 1902) ("[Tlhe contract
having been fully performed by the plaintiff, and the defendants having had the
benefit of such performance for a period of four years, they ought not now to be
allowed to urge its invalidity.... One who accepts and retains the benefits of a
contract cannot allege, as a defense to an action upon it, that it is void as
against public policy.").
137. See supra note 129 (indicating that arbitrators often consider the
conferral of undue benefits, or breaches of good faith, in applying mandatory
laws).
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disagreements about the relevance of any particular
country's mandatory laws in the context of a given
arbitration, those situations only involve disagreements
about the proper conflicts analysis. They do not represent a
challenge to the existence of mandatory laws per se.
Furthermore, in navigating the contours of mandatory
law, party autonomy continues to play a key role. By
selecting the administering institution, the seat of
arbitration, and by, thus, influencing the selection of
conflicts rules, disputing parties may significantly alter the
disposition of tribunals to apply the mandatory laws of
particular jurisdictions. Also, following the application of
mandatory laws, the consequences fall to be determined
under contractual choices of law. As a result, party
autonomy continues to regulate a wide and hotly contested
battleground. 38 Under these circumstances, the distance
between theory and practice seems narrow, with effective
bridging mechanisms already in place.
138. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 26 ("Asking all these questions . . .
demonstrates how far a court or arbitral tribunal can go in giving effect to
[mandatory] laws without necessarily overriding the parties' choice of law.").
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